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Executive Summary
The literature on the health economics of smoking presents twoprincipal facts:
(1) that smoking increases health care costs and (2) that restrictions onsmoking
lead to reductions in smoking prevalence and intensity. Someresearchers have
hypothesized that these two facts, in combination, allow the inferencethat re-
stricting smoking will lower health care costs. For various reasons,however,
observed associations between smoking and health care use onthe one hand,
and regulations and smoking on the other, do not imply acausal effect of the
restrictions on health care.
This article extends the literature by examining whethercigarette tax in-
creases lead to lower health care costs. Usingdata from the 1991 and 1993 Na-
tional Health Interview Surveys, it first reproduces the principalresults in the
literature on smoking, taxes, and health care utilization, and thenestimates the
effects of tobacco taxes on health care. The results indicate that once one con-
trols for endogenous quits, the health care benefits of smokingcessation are
greater than previously believed. Weak evidence suggeststhat tax increases
lead to higher cessation rates. In combination, these results suggestthat, in ad-
dition to providing a source for funding excess health care costs, taxincreases
may lower health care costs (for givenlongevity) directly by inducing smokers
to quit.
I.Introduction
Three results dominate the health economics literature onthe causes
and consequences of smoking: (1) increased excise taxesand other re-
strictions reduce smoking, (2) increases in smokinglead to a deteriora-
tion in health, and (3) this deterioration in healthleads to higher health
care costs. One of the most notable recenthealth policy events, the
multibihion dollar settlement between state attorneys generaland the
major tobacco companies, is a direct consequence of thesehigher
health care costs.32 Moore and Hughes
The liability settlement is only the most recent attempt bygovern-
ment to intervene in the market for smoking. Governments have im-
plemented information policies, such as the 1956 report by the British
Health Service and the 1964 U.S. Surgeon General's Reporton the link
between smoking and lung cancer, as well as the 1970 broadcast adver-
tising ban. Tax policy has been a frequent tool in government attempts
to limit smoking. Policies have also tried to limit smoking more directly
through smoking bans in state and federal buildings, in additionto
bans in certain private establishments.
Such government restrictions stem from two motivations. First,as a
revenue-generating device, tobacco excise taxes can be particularly ef-
fective, as smoking demand is relatively inelastic. Tobacco taxreve-
nues, at least ostensibly, can then be targeted to finance the greater
health care costs due to smoking. Second, some of the effects of smok-
ing are external. The most obvious of these are the excess health insur-
ance premiums paid by nonsmokers. Less obvious are the effects due
to the decreased longevity of smokers. Tax revenues are lost due topre-
mature mortality that would otherwise help fund public programs.
These losses are offset by reduced withdrawals from publicprograms.
More controversial are the potential external costs to the unborn and
the health costs of secondhand smoke at home and in public places.
Interest in understanding the costs of smoking should extend be-
yond these concerns. As a health policy tool, taxes and other restric-
tionsshould be viewed by publicofficialsasnot only a
revenue-generating device but also as a deterrent. Higher taxescan de-
ter youths from starting to smoke and encourage current smokers to
quit or reduce their cigarette consumption. Proper quantification of
these effects is also important, lest overstatement of the costs leads to
policies that unduly penalize smokers.
Smoking costs are of interest to a broader constituency than justgov-
ernment policy makers. Employers, insurance providers, regulators,
smokers, and nonsmokers of all ages are potentially affected by smok-
ing, and thus by regulatory interventions aimed at altering smoking
practices. A full balancing of the costs and benefits of tobacco regula-
tory interventions requires recognition of these many facets and sound
estimates of their magnitudes. These magnitudes, and their interpreta-
tion, provide the focus for this article.
One particular question that arises from the smoking literature is: If
government regulations decrease smoking, will the economic costs of
smoking decline? Some analysts have combined estimates of the effects
of regulations on smoking and estimates of the effects of smokingonThe Health Care Consequences of Smoking 33
health care costs to conclude that smoking regulations do reduce the
economic cost of smoking. Such an inference is, however, premature at
least. For various reasons that we explain below, observed associations
between regulation and smoking, on the one hand, and smoking and
its economic costs on the other, do not imply that more stringent regu-
lation will lead to lower costs.
In this study, we provide the first direct estimates of the effects of
smoking regulations, in particular, cigarette excise taxes, on the eco-
nomic costs of smoking. The outcomes studied here include hospital-
izations and their duration, physician visits, and lost worktime. The
issues that we address are more generally relevant to other aspects of
the smokinghealth cost nexus as well, and we offer comments on
these aspects of the problem too.
The implications of these issues and of the results described below
are substantial. Earlier studies (see Harris 1987, and Warner1986) have
inferred a direct effect of regulations on health care costs from dispa-
rate studies, rather than estimating it directly in a single dataset.Such a
procedure potentially misstates the net benefits of any intervention. In-
terpreting the observed associations between regulations and smoking
and between smoking and health care as causal, when in fact they
might reflect other underlying mechanisms, will lead to mistaken infer-
ences. Making health and regulatory policy on the basisof such infer-
ences will do more economic harm than good.
II.Literature Review
Smoking, Health, and Health Care Costs
Considerable empirical evidence documents the effects of smoking on
health. The Surgeon General's Reports on the Health Consequences of
Smoking (USDHHS, various years), for example, provide compelling
evidence that smoking increases mortality due to heart disease, cancer,
and chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases. Mortality increases with
quantity smoked and the length of smoking career. It increases with tar
and nicotine levels and interacts positively with alcohol consumption.
It decreases following cessation or reductions in quantity smoked, par-
ticularly among healthy quitters.
Smoking exhibits similar effects on morbidity One highly influential
study, by economist Willard Manning and his colleagues (1993), con-
cludes that smoking (and also excess alcohol consumption and a sed-
entary lifestyle)increases excess, or external, health care costs34 Moore and Hughes
dramatically. Despite this finding, the Manning et al. study concluded
that the cigarette excise taxes were at about the proper level, at least
from the perspective of social welfare maximization. Manning et al.
also concluded that alcohol taxes were quite low relative to their so-
cially optimal level. Perhaps the most surprising finding in the
Manning study is that the excess health care costs of smoking paid by
nonsmokers are almost exactly offset by a transfer of wealth from
smokers to nonsmokers. This transfer is comprised of the pension bene-
fits of smokers that go uncollected due to smokers' reduced longevity.1
Smoking Taxes, and Other Restrictions
A similarly extensive literature documents the effects of price and/or
tax increases on tobacco consumption.2 This literature clearly indicates
that tobacco consumption responds inelastically to price increases.
Grossman (1989) observes that much of the reduction in aggregate
smoking results from quits. A 5 percent reduction in total smoking
by pack-a-day smokers implies, at one extreme, a reduction in smok-
ing of 1 cigarette per person per day. It is also consistent, however,
with five out of every 100 pack-a-day smokers quitting entirely, while
the remaining 95 are unaffected. The latter response is more likely to
result in measurable health effects, as small reductions in smoking
by large numbers of smokers are unlikely to have a significant effect
on health outcomes. On the other hand, quits by otherwise healthy
smokers lead to immediate improvements in smoking-related mortal-
ity. The stylized fact in the literature, at this point, is that roughly
half of the reduction in smoking due to price and tax increases is
due to quits, and the remainder is due to reduced smoking by current
smokers.
A second broad conclusion from the literature is that the effects of
higher prices and taxes are much stronger among younger people, both
in terms of smoking prevalence as well as smoking intensity. Because
about 90 percent of people decide whether ever to smoke by age 25, the
participation effects of interventions on smoking initiation are felt al-
most exclusively among young people.
Regulations and Health
Evidence on the relationship between regulatory interventions and
health outcomes is mixed. Cook and Tauchen (1982) and Moore (1996)The Health Care Consequences of Smoking 35
find statistically significant reductions in chronic effects of alcohol and
tobacco consumption in reduced form estimates of tax-mortality re-
gressions. Evans and Ringel (1999) find that tobacco tax increases lead
to a small but statistically significant increase in birthweight.
On the other hand, considerable evidence indicates that regulations
can lead to unexpected and sometimes adverse health outcomes.Some
of the most notable results include Viscusi's (1984) finding that protec-
tive safety cap regulations lead to more accidental poisonings and
Peltzman's (1975) finding that automobile safety regulations lead to in-
creases in certain types of accidents.3 On the issue of smoking,Evans
and Farrelly (1998) document a statistically significant substitution to-
ward higher tar content in cigarettes as taxes increase.
The effect of smoking regulations on health care utilization and other
outcomes depends crucially on individuals' response to the changed
incentives. Substitutions toward more dangerous substances (other
drugs, stronger cigarettes) would reduce the regulation's impact. If de-
mand for smoking is most inelastic among those most at risk for dis-
ease, regulatory interventions may yield littleobservable response in
health care utilization. The trend toward certain smoke-free or
smoke-friendly environments may have little effect other than sorting
and self-selection by workers and customers.
Estimation of the causal effect of regulations presents related prob-
lems. Unobservables such as differences in the rate of time preference
among individuals and unobserved health shocks thatresult in reverse
causation between smoking and health care utilization confound the
empirical analysis of smoking and health care. Sorting in the labor and
health care markets, and mismatches between affected populations in
empirical models of smoking and regulation, and of health care and
smoking, can also present difficulties for the empirical estimation. Esti-
mates of the effect of regulations on smoking are also confounded by
regulatory variables that are correlated with both the intervention and
with smoking. In assessing the effects of, for example, an excise tax in-
crease, other state-level interventions, such as information campaigns
or bans on smoking in public places, must be controlled toidentify the
tax effect. Likewise, environmental factors, including the local culture,
age composition, the importance of smoking to the local economy,and
the local unemployment rate, might be correlated with both individual
cigarette consumption and with the stringency of regulations. Finally,
in assessing the effects of company-level policies such as workplace
smoking bans, account must be taken of factors such as companywide36 Moore and Hughes
smoking prevalence and other company policies that might affect both
smoking behavior and the prevalence of smoking bans.
The remainder of the article seeks to provide some perspectiveon
these issues. The next section discusses the economic issues in more de-
tail. Following that, the data used in this study and the empirical re-
sults are presented. The final section of the article discusses limitations
of the current study and suggests future directions.
III.Conceptual and Empirical Framework
The principal finding that we seek to examine is not controversial:reg-
ulations that limit smoking are associated with a decreased demand for
health care and with changes in other smoking-related health and labor
market outcomes. The focus of our analysis is on both the magnitude
and the interpretation of the effect. In particular, we seek to determine
the change in health care utilization generated by exogenous changes in
smoking and the change in smoking generated by exogenous interven-
tions.
To fix our ideas, imagine there is an exogenous shock, suchas a tax
increase motivated by revenue concerns. In response to this shock,
some smokers might continue to smoke but reduce their tobacco in-
take, while others might quit entirely. In each of these instances, evi-
dence indicates a significant lowering of health care costs. The
observed association between smoking changes and changes in health
care utilization here would estimate the causal effect of smoking cessa-
tion on health care costs.
Imagine now the opposite extreme of a completely endogenous
shock, such as a heart attack or a diagnosis of smoking-related illness,
such as high blood pressure or emphysema. Here, we would expect to
see a reduction in smoking due to the adverse health event and a corre-
sponding increase in health care utilization. In this case, obviously, the
causality runs in the other direction, and the observed association be-
tween smoking and health care use does not reflect the causal influence
of smoking cessation. Failure to control for this reverse causation in
general will lead to an understatement of the effects of smoking cessa-
tion on health care costs.
A controlled experiment designed to test the hypothesis that smok-
ing leads to increased health care costs could proceed in the following
manner. Individual subjects would be selected at random and their
health care and labor market practices observed. Measurements takenThe Health Care Consequences of Smoking 37
would include health care variables such as smoking, physician visits,
and hospitalizations. Labor market outcomes such as lost workdays,
health insurance costs to employers, labor force participation, and
hours of work would also be observed. Following these baseline obser-
vations, randomly selected individuals would be assigned to smok-
ing/nonsmoking treatment groups.Afterstabilizationoftheir
respective smoking patterns and given enough time for smoking to ex-
ert an effect on health care use, the same health care and labor market
practices would be measured postintervention for each group. Differ-
ences in health care use in the treatment group relative to the changes
in health care use among nonsmoking controls would indicate a causal
effect of smoking on the outcomes of interest.
To estimate the effects of regulations on health care, we could then
hypothetically take the treatment group in the preceding experiment
and assign a randomly selected portion to a more stringent regulatory
environment, such as hazard information provision, bans on smoking
at their places of work, or a tax on their tobacco consumption. Once
again, changes in the patterns of health care use, smoking, and labor
market performance in the treatment group, now relative to the smok-
ing controls, would indicate causal effects of the regulations on the out-
comes of interest.
Such an experiment is obviously not possible, for both ethical and
economic reasons. The primary means for evaluating questions such as
we pose here utilize nonexperimental data and attempt to control in
various ways for the many confounding influences noted above. Ob-
served nonexperimental data represent a rather murky stew of both ex-
ogenous and endogenous smoking, regulation, and health care
processes. Our task here is to separate the effects of the competing
influences on both smoking and on health care use.
To introduce the economic and statistical issues, we denote the ex-
pectation of health care expenditures by E[HC}, and partition it into ex-
penditures by those who have never smoked, N; former smokers, F;
and current smokers, C; weighted by their respective probabilities of
occurrence. Expected health care use is then equal to
E[HC] = P(N)E[HC I NI + P(F)E[HC I F] + P(C)E[HC I C] (2.1)
Since the probabilities sum to one, we can rewrite equation (2.1) as
E[HC] = P(N)E[HC I N] + P(F)E[HC IF] + (1 - P(N) - (2.2)
P(F))E[HC I C]38 Moore and Hughes
Differentiation of equation (2.2) yields an expression that partitions
changes in health care into two components: those due to changes in
the expected utilizations, conditional on smoking status, and those due
to changes in smoking status, conditional on utilization. Since regula-
tions will probably not affect the conditional expectations of health care
expenditures, we ignore these former effects and focus our attention on
the effects of changes in smoking status. Lettingindicate change, we
can write changes in health care due to changes in smoking status as
LE[HC] = [FJIHC I N] - E[HC C]]P(N) + [E[HC IF] - (2.3)
E[HC I C]]zP(F)
Thus, changes in health care expenditures due to changes in smoking
status equal the sum of the relative costs of never and former smoking,
weighted by the changes in the probabilities of never and former smok-
ing status. Clearly, if the costs of never and/or former smoking are
lower than current, anything that increases the likelihood of either, rel-
ative to current smoking, will decrease health care costs.
Regulations, R, will affect health care costs via their effects on smok-
ing status. If we denote a regulatory intervention by iR, then the effect
on health care is given by the expression
AE[HCl/LR = [[E[HC I N] - F[HC I C]J(iP(N)/R) + (2.4)
[E[HC I F] - E[HC I C]](P(F)/R)
In this framework, changes in health care costs due to regulatory inter-
ventions operate entirely through the effects of the regulations on
smoking status. Estimation of the regulatory effect thus requires two
pieces of information: (1) the relative health care cost differentials and
(2) the effects of the intervention on smoking status. If estimates of ei-
ther or both of these components are biased, then mistaken inferences
about the regulatory effect are the likely result.
The most well-known estimates of the cost differentials are found
in Manning et al. (1993). We replicate these estimates below using
more recent data from the National Health Interview Surveys and illus-
trate their use in constructing estimates of health care costs. We also
illustrate how the classification of former smokers as recent versus
long-term quitters affects these calculations.
Estimates of the effects of regulatory interventions on smoking par-
ticipation are extensive.4 Interventions studied include excise taxes, in-
formation policies, and bans on smoking in public places.5 We alsoThe Health Care Consequences of Smoking 39
present estimates below that replicate the main findings in this litera-
ture to position ourselves for the subsequent analyses.
Broadly speaking, the findings in this literature are twofold: (1)
smoking leads to higher health care costs and (2) regulations that raise
the cost of smoking reduce smoking. Simply combining these two facts
to compute an ad hoc estimate of the effects of the intervention on
health care costs may not be valid for various reasons.6 First, as noted
above, the estimated cost differentials are potentially confounded by
the endogenous nature of smoking.7 The second source of bias in the
policy experiment arises from mistaken inferences about the effects of
the intervention on smoking status. Tax increases might lead to substi-
tutions toward higher tar content generic cigarettes, with a reduction in
the number of cigarettes smoked, which would tend to increase health
problems.8 Workplace smoking bans might lead smokers to congregate
in poorly ventilated smoking areas or to smoke cigarettes more in-
tensely both at work and at home, thus inhaling the higher concentra-
tions of chemicals as the cigarette burns nearer to thefilter.
Alternatively, the regulatory stringency could reflect political economy
effects, such as a higher ex ante prevalence of nonsmokers where smok-
ing is banned, that are also related to individual smoking through peer
group and social interaction effects.9 Low taxes couldalso be correlated
with other omitted regulations and also with aspects of the local envi-
ronment, such as culture and labor market conditions. If these local
characteristics also affect individual smoking, estimated tax elasticities
that fail to take them into account are biased.
A third source of bias, which can arise even if the cost differentials
and smoking participation effects are consistently estimated, results
from a mismatch of effects, where those smokers who respond to the
regulation are not the same smokers whose behavior is causing health
problems. If an excise tax increase or a workplace smoking ban lead to
a reduction in smoking primarily among light smokers,but heavy
smokers are the ones with higher care costs, then the tax will have no
effect on health care. In this case, we could actually have consistent es-
timates of both effects, but the inference reached by combining the ef-
fects would be invalid.10
This problem arises due to a failure to incorporate the covariance of
the coefficients into the exercise. The ad hoc policy experiment simply
multiplies estimates of the coefficients from separate regressions. This
technique is not correct, however, because for a tax-smoking coefficient40 Moore and Hughes
and a smoking-health coefficient -y, the following is approximately
true:
E[&]E[}E[] + Coy (&)
Thus, the product of estimated coefficients will over- or understate the
true effect according to the sign of the covariance.
We address these problems in two distinct ways. First, to estimate
the effects of regulations on smoking cessation, (zP(F)/zR), and of ces-
sation on health care costs, E[HC I F] - E[HC I C], we partition the for-
mer smokers in our 1991 NHIS sample into recent and long-term
quitters and compare their health care costs to those of current smok-
ers. Recent quitters will include a larger fraction of endogenous quit-
ters or perhaps will exhibit more accurately health care use patterns
that are more likely to reflect the effects of past smoking on health.
Long-term quitters will include only those whose health care use has
stabilized at a level more reflective of their no longer smoking. This
partitioning will capture two influences we seek to measure: that of
smoking cessation independent of unobserved health shocks, and also
the latency period between smoking cessation and the return to good
health. When combined with estimates of the effects of regulations on
quitting, these results provide information on the causal effect of the
regulations on lifetime health care as they operate through smoking
cessation.
Estimates of the effects of regulations on youth smoking and of
youth smoking on health care use are not emphasized in our analysis,
although we will comment on their role. Most of the health care impli-
cations for youthful smokers are long-term in nature, and our study fo-
cuses more on the short-term costs of morbidity considered by
Manning et al. (1993). However, our results can be used to help con-
struct lifetime profiles of health care use and we provide some exam-
ples below.
Our second empirical approach estimates the reduced form of the
model. While leaving the structural mechanisms by which regulations
operate unspecified, reduced form estimates provide direct evidence
about the question of whether smoking regulations affect health care
costs. This approach circumvents many of the problems described
above by relegating the structural effects to "black box" status. In par-
ticular, bias in estimates of the cost differentials, and also the mismatch
problem, will not plague the reduced form estimates. On the otherThe Health Care Consequences of Smoking 41
hand, the potential biases in estimates of the regulatory effects due to
omitted factors, such as other regulations, will remain.
IV.Empirical Results
Aggregate Data
To illustrate some of the issues described above, we first examine data
aggregated by state and year. Figure 2.1 describes the broad trends in
per capita smoking and in the real tax rate for the period 1960-1995.
Each series is indexed to 1.0 for 1983. Smoking, which had risen
steadily from 1945-1960, was relatively fiat from 1960 until it began a
steady decline around 1980. Likewise, taxes were relatively stable, until
the inflation of 1970-1980 eroded them significantly in real terms. The
1983 tax increase led to an increase in overall tax rates that has per-
sisted, and increased by about another 10 percent, with further federal
and state tax increases. While it is tempting to relate the recent decline
in smoking to the tax increases, the experience in the 1970s indicates
that there is more to the story.
Table 2.1 describes the aggregate data. A panel of state-level data for
the years 1954-1988 was constructed for purposes of the aggregate
analysis. Three models are estimated: a smoking-mortality model that
corresponds to a health production function, a cigarette demand
model, and a reduced form tax-mortality model. Total and smoking-
related mortality rates are used as dependent variables in the mortality
regressions. Control variables include per capita income, two age mix
variables, and state and year dummy variables.
As table 2.1 illustrates, average per capita consumption of cigarettes
equals about 120 packs per year. Given smoking participation of about
30 percent on average over the sample period, this figure implies about
one pack per day smoked by smokers. Nominal prices and excisetax
rates vary widely across states.11 As a rule, real prices and tax rates de-
clined over the sample period, although there were some periods of in-
crease, such as that due to the federal tax increase in 1983.Mortality in
the smoking-related disease categories is substantial due to the fact
that cardiovascular mortality represents such a large portion of overall
mortality. Note that actual smoking-related mortality is a fraction of to-
tal mortality in the smoking-related categories. Relative risk for heart
disease in smokers, for example, is about 3:1. With 30 percent of theSources: Tobacco consumption, price, and tax data from Tax Burden on Tobacco, 1993. Per
capita income from SurveyofCurrent Business, various years. Mortality data from Vital
Statisticsofthe United States, Annual Summary, various years. Age mix data from Statistical












Smoking and excise taxes (1983 = 1.00)
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1990 2000-Per capita smoking
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Table 2.1
Descriptive statistics, states, 1954-1988
Per capita tobacco consumption 124.44
(packs per person per year) (29.68)
Price of cigarettes per pack 50.79
(nominal) (30.80)
State and federal excise tax per pack 19.42
(nominal) (8.32)
State per capita income 5106.54
(nominal) (3764.98)
Age 45-64 0.183
(% of state population) (0.047)
Age 65 or more 0.087
(% of state population) (0.031)
Mortality rate-smoking-related diagnoses 495.87
(heart disease; cancers of lung, mouth, and throat) (88.6)
Mortality rateall causes 904.50
(110.67)
Sample size 1680
(48 states, 1954-1988)The Health Care Consequences of Smoking 43
population smoking and cardiovascular mortality of about 400 deaths
per 100,000 population, this ratio would imply about 750deaths per
100,000 for cardiovascular disease (CVD) among smokers and 250
among nonsmokers.
The first half of table 2.2 presents estimates of the smoking and in-
come coefficients from the structural versionsof the health production
model. In the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, mortality is re-
gressed on per capita smoking and the control variables. The time
dummies control for economywide effects such as underlying health
trends, the issuance of the 1963 Surgeon General's Report that first
officially linked smoking and cancer, the activity surrounding broad-
cast advertising in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and thefederal tax
increase of 1983. The state dummies control for time-invariant state-
specific effects that might be correlated with both tax rates and mortal-
ity. In the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimates, smoking is treated
as endogenous, and the excise tax rate isused as the identifying instru-
mental variable.
The OLS estimates in column 1 imply that an increase in aggregate
smoking of two packs per capita per year will increase mortality in the
short run by almost one death per 100,000, or about 2,500 deaths na-
tionally. If all this aggregate increase were due to greater smoking par-
ticipation at a level of one pack per day, an aggregate increase of two
packs per year would be generated by fifty additional smokers per
100,000 population.
It was argued above that reverse causation is an important issue in
estimating the effects of smoking on health and health care use when
using nonexperimental data, and that failure to control for this reverse
causation can lead to an understatement of the estimated health effects.
We can control for the reverse causation by estimating the production
model using two stage least squares. The two stage estimates indicate
that the nonrandom nature of smoking leads to a substantial under-
statement of its effect on mortality. According to the 2SLS results, the
two pack per day increase in aggregate smoking described abovewill
increase the mortality rate by 1.6 per year, or 4,000 deaths nationally.12
The second half of table 2.2 presents estimates of cigarette demand
equations and of mortality-tax models similar to those estimated by
Cook and Tauchen (1982) and Moore (1996). As the table indicates, tax
changes lead to significant declines in aggregate smoking. The estimated
tax-smoking elasticity equals about 0.4 at the sample means, which is
consistent with the majority of evidence reported in the literature (see44 Moore and Hughes
Table 2.2
Aggregate mortality and smoking, states, 1954-1988 structural model estimates
OLS Estimatesa b 2SLS Estimatesa,
aAdditional control variables include dummy indicators of state andyear, and two
age-mix variables.
bldentifying instrumental variable is state-year real cigarette excisetax.
cAdditional control variables include dummy indicators of state andyear, and two
age-mix variables.
Chaloupka and Warner 2000). If we were to perform the policy experi-
ment described above using these estimates and those in the first half
of the table, we would conclude that the tax-mortality effect is the
product of the tax-smoking and smoking-mortality coefficients, or
about 0.5 (1.266 X 0.387). These are about one-third smaller than the
two stage estimates, which control for the endogeneity of smoking.
We can also estimate the mortality effects of taxes directly via the re-
duced form of the model, i.e., by eliminating the smoking variable and
regressing mortality directly on the tax rate. In the second half of table
2.2, these results indicate that tax increases lead to significant short-run
declines in overall mortality in the reduced form.'3 According to the es-
timates for total mortality, a 10 percent increase in the tobacco excise
tax will lead to slightly less than one-half of 1 percent reduction in
overall mortality.
The results in the second half of table 2.2 present some evidence
about the validity of the instrumental variables estimates. The cigarette
Smoking (per
capita packs)

























Per capita smokingc Total deaths
C Smoking deathsc
Cigarette tax 1.266 1.072 0.989
(0.071) (0.199) (0.145)
Real income 1 .OE-3 0.002 0.005
(0.7E-3) (0.002) (0.002)
Adjusted 0.849 0.910 0.926
R-squaredThe Health Care Consequences of Smoking 45
tax is a powerful omitted variable with which to estimate the smoking
effect in the structural model. Whether it meets the more subtle re-
quirements of admissibility as an instrument is a more difficult ques-
tion. Angrist et al. (1996) provide a useful perspective by which to
evaluate this question. For smoking to be interpreted as an experimen-
tal treatment in the two stage least squares estimates in the first half of
table 2.2, the effect of taxes on health must operate entirely through the
smoking variable. Thus, if taxes are correlated with the unobservable
variables that are also related to health, their validity as an instrument
is questionable. To a certain extent, this condition can be controlled by
including a rich set of control variables. In the aggregate results here,
the state and time dummies, income, and age mix are all significant
predictors of the health outcome. Given the inclusion of these other
variables as regressors, the tax variable is to be interpreted as explain-
ing variation in smoking using within-state changes in taxes, over time.
If there are no other important time- and state-varying factors that af-
fect smoking and health, the two stage estimates can be interpreted as
causal. Two possible candidates not considered here are border taxes
and other smoking- and health-related regulations that may be chang-
ing at the state level. Most evidence indicates that border taxes are
significant determinants of smoking. However, their inclusion as
regressors does not appear to affect estimated effects ofstate-of-
residency tax changes on smoking or on health outcomes in other stud-
ies. Similar conclusions hold for state-level smoking regulations.14
As a final note, cigarette taxes have been used primarily as a reve-
nue-generating device, so we would not expect them to be related di-
rectly to mortality rates. Moore (1996) provides statistical evidence that
the tax rate is not directly related to the health variables but rather op-
erates through the smoking variable.15
Recall that the two principal facts to be examined have to do with the
effects of smoking on health care and of regulations on smoking. The
aggregate regression results indicate that reverse causation may plague
estimates of smoking-mortality models. The results in tables 2.3 to 2.5
further confirm this suspicion.
Epidemio logical Evidence
Table 2.3 presents evidence on the relationship between smoking status
and cardiovascular mortality for current and former smokers from
USDHHS (1990). Results for large-scale epidemiological studies that46 Moore and Hughes
Table 2.3
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Table 2.3 (continued)
Smoking status
and years since Mortality
Ref erence Population quit ratio Comments
Hammond and ACS CPS-I <1 pack/day Men free of CHD
















ACS ACS CPS-II <1 pack/day Men, those with
unpublished (P:1.2 m. Men and cancer, CHD, and

















16+ 1.0948 Moore and Hughes
compare mortality ratios for current and former smokers are pre-
sented, with and without controls for preexisting health conditions. In
the Hammond and Horn (1958) studies, for example, the effects of en-
dogenous quitting are readily apparent. Among smokers of less than
one pack per day, CHD mortality is higher among recent quitters than
current smokers. Among heavier smokers, the excess mortality among
recent quitters is even more substantial. It is interesting to note that, in
this study, former smokers eventually return to CHD mortality rates
(after ten years) that are practically indistinguishable from those of
people who have never smoked. In Hammond and Garfinkel (1969),
where only men free of diagnosed CHD are included, we see an imme-
diate decline in mortality following quits. Likewise, in the American
Cancer Society (ACS) fifty-state study of 1.2 million males and females,
the mortality ratios for light-smoking healthy males drop by about
one-third almost immediately after quitting, while mortality for all
male smokers (not shown), including those with health problems, is 50
to 100 percent higher than for current smokers, depending on amount
smoked. Mortality ratios for females exhibit identical patterns for five
years following quitting.
Table 2.4 presents similar evidence for lung cancer mortality. Two re-
sults in table 2.4 are particularly striking. First, we see once again the
effects of endogenous quitting because lung cancer mortality rates for
recent quitters are consistently higher, often dramatically so, than for
current smokers. Also, despite the long latency period for lung cancers,
it is interesting to note that lung cancer mortality rates begin to fall be-
low those of current smokers only three to five years after quitting. In
some cases, the decline is substantial.
Table 2.5 presents similar results for oral cancers. Once again, we see
that mortality rates for recent quitters are higher than for current smok-
ers, unless smokers who quit on their doctors orders are excluded. The
consistent implication in these tables is that health is a fundamental de-
terminant of smoking status. As such, it is incorrect to interpret ob-
served associations between smoking and health as causal without
additional controls, such as excluding unhealthy quitters in the epide-
miological studies.
The implications of these results for the welfare estimates should be
clear. Epidemiological estimates of the effects of smoking on mortality
and longevity in human subjects are typically not based on random as-
signment to smoking levels. When we control for this nonrandom as-
signment, continued smoking increases mortality, and therefore
reduces longevity, by more than previously believed. One implicationTable 2.4
Smoking cessation and lung cancer (selected studies)
Hammond (1966) ACS CPS-I Never <20/day 20+/day
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Table 2.5




































Rogot and MurrayU.S. veteransNever 1.0 Quitters on doctor's






Kahn (1966) U.S. veteransNever 1.0 Quitters on doctor's
(P:N = 248,195)Current 3.8 orders excluded
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is that, because reduced longevity results in a transfer of pension
wealth that compensates nonsmokers for the excess health care costs of
smokers, the amount of this transfer is understated and the external
costs of smoking are overstated when smoking is treated as exoge-
nously determined.
Manning et al. Replication
In this section, we introduce the microdata used for the remainder of
the study and present a replication of the results of Manning et al.
(1993). Table 2.6 defines the variables, which are drawn from the 1991
and 1993 National Health Interview Surveys. Table 2.7 presents de-
scriptive results by smoking status. Comparison of the means across
the three columns in table 2.7 provides suggestive, but far from conclu-
sive, evidence on many of the relationships of interest to this study.
Current smokers spend more days in the hospital than those who have
never smoked, with little difference in hospitalization rate.This finding
suggests that current smokers' health problems are more severe than
those of nonsmokers because their average length of hospital stay is
greater. Former smokers exhibit even greater use of the hospital than
current smokers, suggestive again of a causal effect runningfrom
health to smoking status. Current and former smokers miss 30 to 50
percent more workdays than nonsmokers. On the other hand, current
smokers and those who have never smoked have approximately the
same rate of utilization of outpatient doctor visits,while former smok-
ers use substantially more. Because this measureincludes "well care"
episodes like annual checkups, this finding is not particularly surpris-
ing. Also, visits to the doctor may provide an impetus to quit smoking,
again suggesting a causal relationship from health care to smoking
status.
Personal demographic characteristics do not differ appreciably
across smoking categories. Significant differences areobserved for edu-
cation, where those who have never smoked and former smokers are
more than twice as likely to have finished college, andonly one-quarter
less likely to have dropped out of high school. The same is true for in-
come, where smokers are much less likely to be in thehighest income
bracket of $50,000 a year or more. Those who have never smoked are
more likely to be single than are current smokers,while current smok-
ers are twice as likely to be divorced orseparated. Former smokers are
more likely to be married than are currentsmokers and those who have









































Working in public sector
Working in private sector
Definition
Number of doctor visits in past 12 months
Number of short-stay hospital days in
past 12 months, excluding delivery
Number of short-stay hospital episodes in
past 12 months, excluding delivery
Hospital days per episodes (nearest
integer)











1 if education < 12 years
1 if education = 12-15 years







1 if family income missing





1 if working in public sector




Excellent health I if health self-reported as excellent
Very good health I if health self-reported as very good
Good health I if health self-reported as good
Fair health 1 if health self-reported as fair
Poor health 1 if health self-reported as poor
Seatbelt user 1 if wears seatbelt regularly
Cigarettes per day Number of cigarettes smoked per day, smokers only
Health insurance
Private insurance 1 if private insurance







differ on average body mass or family size. There is a slightly larger
fraction of former smokers and those who have never smoked working
in the public sector.
The next set of estimates examines the self-assessed health and the
health practices of the three groups. The majority of sample members
in all groups rate their own health as good to excellent. There is a ten-
dency for those who have never smoked to rate their health more
highly: 37 percent report being in excellent health, compared to 29 per-
cent for current smokers and 32 percent for former smokers. Very few
sample members report their health as fair or poor, but fair or poor
health is less likely among those who have never smoked.
Seatbelt use is often used as a proxy for health attitudes: the more
concerned one is about longevity and health, the more likely that per-
son is to use a seatbelt. To the extent these attitudes are also correlated
with smoking status as well, the results in table 2.7 suggest that seatbelt
use approximates attitudes as it should: roughly 14 percent more of
those who have never smoked and former smokers always use their
seatbelts compared to current smokers. Finally, there are interesting
differences among the smoking categories in terms of their health in-
surance coverage. Among those with private insurance, former smok-
ers are about 15 percent more likely and those who have never smoked54 Moore and Hughes
Table 2.7








Health outcomes Mean (std. dev.) Mean (std. dev.) Mean (std. dev.)
Doctor visits 4.112 5.222 4.490
(10.135) (14.433) (13.440)
Hospital days 0.508 1.024 0.622
(3.588) (5.869) (4.362)
Hospital episodes 0.081 0.146 0.101
(0.357) (0.516) (0.410)
Lost workdays 0.118 0.144 0.181
(0.882) (1.032) (1.164)
Personal characteristics
Male 0.397 0.587 0.519
(0.489) (0.492) (0.500)
Black 0.124 0.067 0.127
(0.331) (0.251) (0.333)
Age 42.361 51 .049 40.979
(18.729) (16.617) (14.735)
18-21 0.110 0.017 0.064
(0.312) (0.131) (0.244)
22-25 0.100 0.037 0.792
(0.300) (0.188) (0.270)
26-30 0.124 0.063 0.133
(0.330) (0.243) (0.340)
31-35 0.120 0.090 0.148
(0.325) (0.287) (0.355)
36-45 0.187 0.208 0.240
(0.389) (0.406) (0.427)
46-55 0.107 0.174 0.156
(0.289) (0.379) (0.363)
56-65 0.092 0.177 0.060
(0.290) (0.381) (0.237)
Schooling level
Less than high school 0.185 0.197 0.257
(0.388) (0.397) (0.437)
High school 0.571 0.578 0.634
(0.495) (0.494) (0.482)
College 0.103 0.099 0.041
(0.304) (0.298) (0.198)
Income level
Income < 10,000 0.104 0.066 0.121
(0.305) (0.248) (0.326)
10,000-20,000 0.151 0.147 0.177
(0.358) (0.354) (0.381)
20,000-30,000 0.138 0.144 0.166
(0.345) (0.351) (0.372)The Health Care Consequences of Smoking 55
Table 2.7 (continued)
Never smoker Former smokerCurrent smoker
Variable (N = 21,596) (N = 10,220) (N11,197)
Income level
30,000-40,000 0.127 0.132 0.128
(0.333) (0.338) (0.344)
40,000-50,000 0.098 0.114 0.097
(0.298) (0.317) (0.296)
50,000 0.213 0.244 0.158
(0.410) (0.429) (0.364)
Income missing 0.169 0.154 0.154
(0.375) (0.361) (0.361)
Marital status
Single 0.238 0.085 0.179
(0.426) (0.280) (0.384)
Widowed 0.082 0.076 0.049
(0.276) (0.265) (0.217)
Divorced or separated 0.070 0.088 0.144
(0.254) (0.284) (0.352)
Married 0.609 0.750 0.627
(0.487) (0.433) (0.484)
Bmi 25.213 26.137 24.866
(4.917) (4.734) (4.655)
Family size 2.948 2.730 2.968
(1.675) (1.395) (1.597)
Employment status
Working in public sector 0.113 0.097 0.082
(0.317) (0.296) (0.275)
Working in private sector 0.469 0.419 0.555
(0.499) (0.493) (0.497)
Self-rated health status
Excellent health 0.372 0.320 0.285
(0.483) (0.466) (0.451)
Very good health 0.295 0.284 0.289
(0.456) (0.451) (0.453)
Good health 0.236 0.249 0.280
(0.424) (0.433) (0.449)
Fair health 0.073 0.104 0.104
(0.260) (0.305) (0.306)
Poor health 0.024 0.043 0.042
(0.152) (0.204) (0.200)
Seatbelt user 0.758 0.589 0.740
(0.429) (0.492) (0.439)
Cigarettes per day 0.000 0.014 17.982
(0) (0.261) (11.489)aweighted data from pooled 1991 and 1993 National Health Interview Surveys.
10 percent more likely to be covered than are current smokers. This
finding could reflect differences in risk attitudes or perhaps incentives
provided to curtail smoking by insurance policies.
Table 2.8 provides further details on the characteristics of smokers,
former smokers, and those who have never smoked. About 50 percent
of the sample have never smoked. Males are about 5 percent more
likely to smoke than females, and blacks are about 4 percent less likely
to smoke than whites. Older people are more likely to smoke than are
younger, as indicated by the declining percentage of those of either
gender in older cohorts who have never smoked.
Education differences in smoking prevalence are particularly strik-
ing. High school dropouts are much less likely to have never smoked,
while those who have some schooling beyond high school and/or col-
lege are more likely to have never smoked or, if they did smoke at one
time, are more likely to have subsequently quit. Much has been written
about the connection between schooling and smoking. Does the ob-
served negative correlation reflect a causal influence of education on
smoking, where more educated individuals are better able to process
health risk information, or does it reflect sorting by rate of time prefer-
ence, where increased investment in education and aversion to smok-
ing both reflect a greater weight placed on the future?16
Table 2.9 replicates the results of Manning et al. (1993) using pooled
data from the 1991 and 1993 National Health Interview Surveys. As in
56 Moore and Hughes
Table 2.7 (continued)
Never smoker Former smokerCurrent smoker
Variable (N = 21,596) (N10,220) (N = 11,197)
Health insurance
Private insurance 0.781 0.838 0.688
(0.414) (0.368) (0.463)
Public insurance 0.229 0.311 0.204
(0.420) (0.463) (0.403)
Region
North 0.204 0.228 0.195
(0.403) (0.420) (0.396)
South 0.333 0.305 0.345
(0.471) (0.460) (0.475)
Midwest 0.239 0.243 0.261
(0.427) (0.429) (0.439)
West 0.224 0.223 0.199
(0.471) (0.416) (0.400)The Health Care Consequences of Smoking 57
Table 2.8
Smoking prevalence by sociodemographic groups, full sample (1991-1993NHIS)a
aweighted means, not adjusted for age or sex.
Manning et al., we are studying four health care outcomes: doctor vis-
its, hospitalizations, days in the hospital, and lost workdays.
We decompose these results on three additional dimensions: esti-
mates are presented in table 2.9 for "short form" (i.e., withcontrols for
age, gender, race, and year only), and"long-form" models (with addi-
tional controls for potentially endogenous variables, such as seatbelt
use, body mass, insurance coverage, education, etc.,that might be cor-
related with both smoking status and health care use). We also split our
sample between workers and nonworkers. Finally, tables 2.10 to 2.13
present estimates of age-specific estimates of the long- and short-form
models.
Our results are quite consistent with those of Manning et al. The
health care costs of current and former smoking in table 2.9 are
significantly higher than those of people who have never smoked. In








Entire sample 0.502 0.241 0.256
Males aged
18-25 0.256 0.045 0.140
26-35 0.285 0.130 0.284
36-45 0.190 0.208 0.249
46-55 0.092 0.178 0.155
56-65 0.077 0.187 0.097
Females aged
18-25 0.178 0.064 0.145
26-35 0.218 0.185 0.276
36-45 0.184 0.208 0.231
46-55 0.117 0.169 0.156
56-65 0.103 0.161 0.106
Race
White 0.875 0.932 0.873
Black 0.125 0.068 0.127
Years of
schooling
0-11 0.185 0.197 0.267
12 0.349 0.366 0.440
13-15 0.221 0.212 0.194
16 0.141 0.126 0.679
More than 16 0.102 0.099 0.04158 Moore and Hughes
Table 2.9
Smoking and health care utilization (1991 and 1993 National Health Interview Surveys)a
alisfimated coefficients from negative binomial regression models, reportedas incidence
rates, with asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses. Robust, cluster-corrected standard
errors.
bN = 24,646 (short form); 23,913 (long form).
cShortform models include controls for age, race, and gender.
dLongform models include short-form variables, plus controls forprivate and/or public
insurance coverage, seatbelt use, body mass, education, income, region, marital status,
and family size.
Variable Workingb Not workingb
Short formc Long form Short formc Long formd
Hospital episodes
Current 1.259 1.211 1.555 1.259
(3.935) (2.590) (6.219) (2.537)
Former 1.263 1.218 1.632 1.594
(3.562) (2.505) (6.125) (4.788)
Hospital days
Current 1.558 1.331 1.582 1.285
(4.675) (2.369) (3.962) (1.649)
Former 1.257 1.220 1.739 1.799
(2.146) (1.527) (4.126) (3.539)
Doctor visits
Current 1.083 1.162 1.160 1.122
(4.623) (6.666) (5.073) (3.099)
Former 1.245 1.210 1.291 1.318
(11.336) (7.944) (7.50) (6.728)
Lost workdays
Current 1.503 1.403
(5.817) (3.738) NA NA
Former 1.217 1.206
(2.484) (1.914) NA NAThe Health Care Consequences of Smoking 59
Table 2.10
Smoking and hospitalizations: age-specific smoking coefficient estimates' (1991 and 1993
National Health Interview Surveys)b
aEstimated coefficients from negative binomial regression models, reported as incidence
rates, with asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses. Robust, cluster-corrected standard
errors.
bN = 24,646 (short form); 23,913 (long form).
cShort4orm models include controls for age, race, and gender.
dLong..form models include short-form variables, plus controls for private and/or public
insurance coverage, seatbelt use, body mass, education, income, region, marital status,
and family size.
workers and 25 to 55 percent for nonworkers. Note that the inclusion of
the additional control variables makes a difference only in the non-
worker sample, and only for the current smoker effect. Note also that
the current and former smoker effects are similar in magnitude.
Hospital days similarly show strong associations between smoking
status and utilization. Here, however, nonworking former smokers
spend significantly more days in the hospital, while the opposite holds
true among workers. Doctor visits are typically greater for former
smokers than current. This finding reflects an underlying problem with
the doctor visit variable: because many smokers will see the doctor or
quit smoking on doctor's orders, some portion of the observed rela-
tionship will reflect causation in the opposite direction. Lost workdays
are also significantly higher among smoking workers.In both the long-
Age
Short formc Long formd
Current Former Current Former
18-21 1248 1.052 0.951 1.139
(1.051) (0.146) (0.187) (0.395)
22-25 1.683 1.953 1.215 2.263
(2.320) (3.426) (0.782) (4.141)
26-30 1.570 0.880 1.195 0.883
(3.610) (0.608) (0.783) (0.579)
31-35 1.260 1.220 0.947 0.877
(1.684) (1.241) (0.475) (0.692)
36-45 1.675 1.364 1.373 1.237
(6.209) (2.983) (3.119) (1.947)
46-55 1.400 1.348 1.292 1.439
(3.604) (2.452) (2.148) (2.738)
56-65 1.330 1.650 1.272 1.711
(2.414) (6.126) (1.711) (4.854)60 Moore and Hughes
Table 2.11
Smoking and hospital days: age-specific smoking coefficient estimatesa (1991 and 1993
National Health Interview Surveys)"
aEstimated coefficients from negative binomial regression models, reportedas incidence
rates, with asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses. Robust, cluster-corrected standard
errors.
bN = 24,646 (short form); 23,913 (long form).
cShort..form models include controls for age, race, and gender.
dLongform models include short-form variables, plus controls for privateand/or public
insurance coverage, seatbelt use, body mass, education, income, region, marital status,
and family size.
and short-form models, current smokers miss work more often than
former smokers and those who have never smoked.
There is little evidence in the table 2.9 results that inclusion of the ad-
ditional control variables affects the estimated smoking coefficients.
This finding allays concerns about endogeneity due to omitted vari-
ables to some extent. If the included proxies for health attitudes and
time preferences, such as seatbelt use and education, do not alter the
estimated smoking effects, it is less likely that residual unobservables
will be a problem. Reverse causation remains a problem, however,
even though the former smoking coefficients in table 2.9 are typically
lower than the current smoking estimates. In particular, the former
smoking coefficients include the health care use of recent quitters with
health problems, who are more like current smokers, and the health
Age
Short formc Long formd
Current Former Current Former
18-21 1.068 0.543 0.685 1.464
(1.197) (1.206) (1.120) (0.699)
22-25 2.010 3.279 1.304 4.221
(2.655) (4.874) (0.757) (5.221)
26-30 1.899 0.668 1.415 0.358
(2.548) (1.184) (1.261) (0.418)
31-35 1.704 1.804 1.094 1.228
(2.956) (1.919) (0.596) (0.707)
36-45 1.929 1.277 1.254 1.018
(5.170) (1.426) (1.519) (0.106)
46-55 2.016 1.572 1.570 2.072
(3.385) (2.504) (2.745) (4.739)
56-65 1.215 1.788 1.226 1.627
(1.136) (4.606) (1.010) (3.480)The Health Care Consequences of Smoking 61
Table 2.12
Smoking and doctor visits: age-specific smoking coefficient estimatesa (1991 and 1993
National Health Interview Surveys)b
aEsfimated coefficients from negative binomial regression models, reported as incidence
rates, with asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses. Robust, cluster-correctedstandard
errors.
bN = 24,646 (short form); 23,913 (long form).
cShortform models include controls for age, race, and gender.
dLong..form models include short-form variables, plus controls for private and/or public
insurance coverage, seatbelt use, body mass, education, income, region, marital status,
and family size.
care use of long-term quitters, who are morelike those who have never
smoked. Separation of these estimates will be discussed below.
This replication presents preliminary evidence on two components
of the regulatory effects model given by equation (2.4). Current smok-
ers have higher health care costs thanthose who have never smoked,
particularly among older cohorts. The health care costs of former
smokers appear to be similar in magnitude to those of current smokers
based on these preliminary results. These cost differentials can be used
to construct estimates of the health care cost differences inequation
(2.4). However, some of the costs of former smokers might be more cor-
rectly attributed to current smoking if we wish to estimate the long-run
consequences of smoking cessation andof regulations that induce
smokers to quit.
Age
Short formc Long form'
Current Former Current Former
18-21 1.033 1.241 1.174 1.025
(0.307) (1.851) (1.150) (0.220)
22-25 1.203 1.108 1.184 1.085
(2.364) (1.280) (2.691) (0.941)
26-30 1.169 1.263 1.245 1.165
(1.646) (1.903) (2.484) (1.107)
31-35 1.125 1.223 1.186 1.325
(1.591) (2.150) (2.497) (2.716)
36-45 1.221 1.243 1.061 1.209
(3.856) (3.873) (1.243) (3.172)
46-55 1.148 1.284 1.153 1.262
(2.152) (4.734) (1.790) (3.015)
56-65 1.192 1.347 1.122 1.315
(1.755) (4.583) (1.300) (2.880)62 Moore and Hughes
Table 2.13
Smoking and lost workdays age-specific smoking coefficient estimatesa (1991 and 1993
National Health Interview Surveys)'
aEstimated coefficients from negative binomial regression models, reportedas incidence
rates, with asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses. Robust, cluster-corrected standard
errors.
bN= 24,646 (short form); 23,913 (long form).
cShortform models include controls for age, race, and gender.
dLongform models include short-form variables, plus controls forprivate and/or public
insurance coverage, seatbelt use, body mass, education, income, region, marital status,
and family size.
Smoking Status Models
The second set of components of the regulatory effects model are the
smoking status-regulation estimates. Table 2.14 presents estimates of
probit models of never having smoked and former smoking thatpro-
vide estimated excise tax effects. The never having smoked model is
first estimated on the entire pooled 1991 / 1993 NHIS sample. This esti-
mation is obviously misspecified because the never smoking decision
is almost exclusively made before age 25. However, we present the
pooled results as a reference point. The former smoker probit is esti-
mated conditional on ever smoking.17
Table 2.14 presents complete results for pooled long- and short-form
never having smoked and former smoking models. In the short form,
cigarette taxes have a small, statistically significant effecton never
Age
Short formc Long formd
Current Former Current Former
18-21 1.070 0.786 0.867 0.653
(0.429) (0.622) (0.503) (1.087)
22-25 1.225 0.840 1.128 0.843
(1.090) (0.712) (0.590) (0.504)
26-30 1.611 1.185 1.528 1.262
(3.034) (0.750) (1.805) (0.870)
31-35 1.454 1.143 1.486 1.158
(2.628) (0.716) (2.353) (0.520)
36-45 1.634 1.261 1.202 1.162
(4.809) (1.814) (1.146) (0.827)
46-55 1.194 1.305 1.324 1.508
(1.228) (1.555) (1.550) (2.152)
56-65 1.287 1.106 2.114 1.391
(1.096) (0.384) (2.364) (1.326)The Health Care Consequences of Smoking 63
Table 2.14
Smoking status models: estimated coefficients and standard errorsa (1991 and 1993 Na-
tional Health Interview Surveys)b
Variable Never smoked
Former smoker I ever
smoked
Short formcLong formdShort formcLong formd
Cigarette tax 0.001 0.053 0.207 0.021
(1.81) (0.75) (2.43) (0.26)
Male -0.115 -0.132 0.035 0.013
(18.69) (19.54) (4.33) (1.18)
Black 0.046 0.078 -0.154 -0.093
(2.95) (5.22) (12.63) (6.05)
Age 21-25 -0.089 -0.122 0.085 0.019
(7.45) (8.85) (4.05) (0.77)
Age 26-30 -0.156 -0.202 0.110 0.001
(11.92) (13.28) (4.81) (0.04)
Age 31-35 -0.233 -0.266 0.175 0.016
(17.51) (18.32) (8.35) (0.69)
Age 36-45 -0.253 -0.309 0.248 0.062
(18.88) (14.80) (14.57) (2.53)
Age 46-55 -0.311 -0.337 0.311 0.128
(23.50) (19.67) (15.46) (5.24)
Age 56-65 -0.307 -0.309 0.402 0.269
(17.90) (14.80) (21.59) (10.56)
High school dropout -0.045 -0.058
(2.22) (4.09)
Some college 0.046 0.071
(6.75) (5.63)




Seatbelt user 0.096 0.105
(12.56) (11.46)
Body mass index 0.005 0.015
(9.25) (19.01)
Private health insurance 0.053 0.074
(6.18) (6.64)
Public health insurance -0.063 -0.010
(5.20) (0.76)64 Moore and Hughes
Table 2.14 (continued)
Former smoker I














































aMargtual effects computed at sample means. Asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses.
Robust, cluster-corrected standard errors.
bN = 24,646 (short form); 23,913 (long form).
cShort..form models include controls for age, race, and gender.
dLongform models include short-form variables, plus controls for private and/or public
insurance coverage, seatbelt use, body mass, education, income, region, marital status,
and family size.
smoking. While suggestive, the fact that this effect is observed over all
ages suggests the possibility that the state tax rates are correlated with
other variables that affect smoking across all age groups. Males are less
likely to have never smoked than are females, and blacks more likely
than whites. The pattern of age coefficients is broadly consistent with
earlier research: smoking is much more likely among older people.
In the long form, the cigarette tax effect becomes statistically
insignificant. This finding likely reflects the inclusion of the region
dummy variables. Other effects of note are those of education, where
we see that the less educated are more likely to smoke. Seatbelt users
are about 10 percent less likely ever to smoke, as are individuals with
privatehealthinsurancecoverage. Incomeeffectsarelargely
Short formcLong form" Short formc Long formcThe Health Care Consequences of Smoking 65
insignificant. Family composition, on the other hand, is an important
predictor of never-smoking status: each additional family member is
associated with a 1.5 percent greater likelihood of never smoking, and
single people are 5 percent less likely to have never smoked than their
married counterparts.
Former smokers exhibit similar patterns. The cigarette tax matters
only statistically in the short form. Former smokers are more likely in
older cohorts. Because males are more likely to smoke and blacks are
less likely, it seems reasonable to expect also that males would be more
likely to quit and blacks less likely, conditional on ever smoking. The
results in table 2.14 support this expectation. The additional control
variables exhibit statistically significant positive associations between
education and smoking cessation. Likewise, seatbelt users are more
likely to quit, as are those with private health coverage. Quitters are
concentrated in the higher income brackets and also among the
married.
Taken at face value, these coefficient estimates could be used to com-
plete the policy experiment described in equation (2.4); that is, we
could combine estimates of the effects of smoking status on health care
use from table 2.9 with estimates of the effects of cigarette taxes on
smoking status from table 2.14 to estimate the effects of taxes on health
care. Ideally, we would have age-specific estimated effects.The
age-specific smokinghealth care effects could be discounted to present
values, combined with the age-specific tax effects, and summed to ar-
rive at an estimate of the lifetime effects of taxes on health care costs.18
As an example of the kinds of problems that arise in using these esti-
mates to compute regulatory effects, suppose we use the results in ta-
bles 2.9 and 2.14 to estimate the effect of a tax increase of $1 per pack on
lifetime hospitalizations for nonworkers. The results in table 2.9 indi-
cate that the former smokers' hospitalization rates are higher than
those of current smokers, particularly in the long-form models. Thus, if
we combine the short-form tax effects from table 2.14,which indicate
that a tax increase of $1 per pack would increase quits by 20.7 percent-
age points, with those in table 2.9, which indicate a 34 percent higher
utilization rate for nonworking former smokers, we would conclude
that the tax increase would increase health care costs of hospitalizations
by about 7 percent.19
Clearly this is not the end of the story. Quitting smoking leads to
health improvements that gradually approach those of people who
have never smoked. The estimates in table 2.9 do not capture this ef-
fect, however, because the former smokers will include some recent66 Moore and Hughes
smokers, many of whom have quit for smoking-related health reasons.
Thus, it would be more correct to ascribe some of the observed hospi-
talizations among former smokers to smoking, with the residual used
to compute the health care benefits of smoking cessation.
Tables 2.10 to 2.13 decompose the health care by current and former
smoking estimates by age group. The cumulative and long-term nature
of the health care consequences of smoking are indicated clearly in ta-
bles 2.10 to 2.13. With few exceptions, no significant relationship be-
tween smoking and health care utilization is found until age 36. Some
significant coefficients among younger workers are observed in the
short form for hospitalizations, hospital days, and doctor visits, but
these are typically dissipated by the inclusion of the long-form vari-
ables, suggesting that the effects reflect correlated behaviors. It is inter-
esting to note that the former smoking estimates are regularly larger
than the current smoking effects among older workers. If smoking-
related health problems materialize relatively late in life, we would ex-
pect recent quitters, in particular, to have higher health care costs. This
expectation is borne out in the estimates of tables 2.10 to 2.13.
Table 2.15 presents age-specific tax estimates. There is little evidence
that taxes affect the never having smoked and former smoking deci-
sions of the young in table 2.15. The most consistent evidence of any
regulatory effect appears in the short-form results for the quit equation.
The estimates reported there suggest that a $1 increase in the tax would
have a considerable effect on the quit decision. For the 26- to
30-year-olds, the estimated coefficient is .30. At the mean tax rate in the
data of 33 cents per pack, this coefficient implies a quit/tax elasticity of
about .67, which is not unreasonable.
As was the case earlier, we could combine the estimated age-specific
smokinghealth care effects presented here with the age-specific tax
smoking estimates in the ad hoc policy experiment. In this case, we
could also, in principle, construct an artificial agecosts profile and esti-
mate the lifetime health care effects of smoking status and the lifetime
benefits of regulations that alter smoking status. The problem of re-
verse causation once again manifests itself here, however, as we can see
by inspecting the current and former smoking estimates for nonwork-
ers. In particular, since former smokers' health care utilization is higher
for nonworkers for each of the three outcomes considered, the infer-
ence would be that taxes would increase health care costs in this group
of smokers by inducing a shift to the higher cost former smoking
status.The Health Care Consequences of Smoking 67
Table 2.15
Cigarette tax coefficientsa: smoking status modelsXage group (1991 and 1993 National
Health Interview Surveys)b
aMarginal effects computed at sample means. Asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses.
Robust, cluster-corrected standard errors.
bN = 24,646 (short form); 23,913 (long form).
cShort..form models include controls for age, race, and gender.
dLong..form models include short-form variables, plus controls for private and/or public
insurance coverage, seatbelt use, body mass, education, income, region, marital status,
and family size.
What is needed is a way to discriminate between healthy and un-
healthy quitters. A simple solution is available in the 1991 NHIS, which
provides information on the length of time each former smoker has
been a former smoker. We can thus construct relative health care utili-
zation rates by duration of quit similar to the mortality tables pre-
sented earlier.
Our expectation that long-term quitters would have significantly
lower costs than current smokers and recent quitters is strongly borne
out by the data. Table 2.16 presents a decomposition of health costs by
smoking status for the 1991 NHIS, with former smokers now grouped
into those who quit within the previous year or one to four years, five
to nine years, and 10 or more years ago. The first four rows of the table
present means for the health care outcome variables. Those who have
never smoked have consistently lower utilization rates foreach out-
come. Interestingly, the most recent quitters have substantiallyhigher
Age Never smoked Former smoker I ever smoked
(N=never; ever) Short formcLong formd Short formcLong form'
18-21 0.102 0.177 0.078 0.053
(N = 3,776: 1,086) (1.00) (1.44) (0.50) (0.075)
22-25 0.108 0.252 0.233 0.239
(N = 4,518: 1,659) (1.01) (3.21) (2.31) (1.70)
26-30 0.262 0.086 0.304 0.208
(N = 7,017: 3,040) (2.72) (0.71) (2.56) (2.07)
31-35 0.246 0.157 0.245 -0.004
(N = 7,749: 3,906) (2.65) (1.85) (1.90) (0.04)
36-45 0.013 -0.40 0.118 -0.003
(N = 13,083: 6,998) (0.15) (0.37) (1.25) (0.03)
46-55 0.074 0.007 0.212 -0.161
(N = 8,427: 5,097) (0.092) (0.05) (2.07) (1.81)
56-65 -0.032 -0.009 0.231 -0.125
(N = 7,342: 4,415) (0.036) (0.08) (2.08) (0.89)68 Moore and Hughes
Table 2.16
Health indicator and self-reported health status by smoking status, 1991 NHIS
aweighted means, not adjusted for age and sex.
rates than do the current smokers. After one year has elapsed, how-
ever, this ranking begins to reverse itself, often quickly and dramati-
cally. The message of these results is that the estimated cost differences
in equation (2.4) must take endogenous quitting into account.
Table 2.17 presents similar findings, with controls added for the
short- and long-form regression models. In each case, the most recent
quitters have higher use rates than do current smokers. This rate begins
to reverse itself almost immediately, to the point that long-term quit-
ters' health care use patterns are often no different statistically from
people who have never smoked. Recent quitters are thus more like cur-
rent smokers. In estimating the cost differentials for equation (2.4), it is
therefore more accurate to include these costs with those of current
smokers. This move will serve to increase both the estimated gains of
smoking cessation and those of never smoking, relative to those im-
plied by the earlier replication results. The results in table 2.18 for non-
workers are even more dramatic, although not unexpected. If the









1 to 4 years
Quit
5 to 9 years
Quit
> 10 years
Lost 0.118 0.181 0.282 0.127 0.132 0.125
workdays(0.882) (1.164) (1.508) (0.932) (0.971) (0.964)
Hospital 0.081 0.101 0.241 0.140 0.136 0.149
episodes (0.357) (0.410) (0.655) (0.487) (0.570) (0.505)
Hospital 0.508 0.622 2.545 0.967 0.833 0.941
days (3.588) (4.362) (12.850) (6.324) (4.368) (4.348)
Doctor 4.112 4.490 6.786 5.712 5.073 5.100
visits (10.135) (13.440) (24.980) (18.291) (12.778) (11.304)
Excellent 0.372 0.284 0.339 0.325 0.323 0.304
health (0.483) (0.451) (0.473) (0.468) (0.468) (0.460)
Very good 0.295 0.289 0.295 0.290 0.283 0.281
health (0.456) (0.453) (0.456) (0.454) (0.451) (0.449)
Good 0.235 0.280 0.227 0.247 0.238 0.260
health (0.425) (0.449) (0.419) (0.431) (0.426) (0.439)
Fair health0.073 0.104 0.094 0.096 0.106 0.110
(0.260) (0.306) (0.292) (0.294) (0.308) (0.313)
Poor 0.024 0.042 0.045 0.043 0.049 0.045
health (0.152) (0.200) (0.207) (0.202) (0.049) (0.207)The Health Care Consequences of Smoking 69
Table 2.17
Smoking and health care utilization, negative binomial regression estimates,a worker
sample'
aEstimated coefficients from negative binomial regression models, reported as incidence
rates, with asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses. Robust, cluster-corrected standard
errors.
bN = 24,646 (short form); 23,913 (long form).
cShort..form models include controls for age, race, and gender.
dLong4orm models include short-form variables, plus controls for private and/or public












Current smoker 1.290 1.696 1.112 1.566
(3.612) (4.611) (5.027) (5.229)
Former smoker
(years quit)
<1 2.467 3.170 1.350 2.263
(5.515) (4.012) (4.930) (3.339)
1-4 1.231 1.044 1.426 1.077
(1.306) (0.161) (7.253) (0.368)
5-9 1.273 1.540 1.220 1.101
(1.661) (1.745) (4.358) (0.514)
10+ 1.128 1.012 1.224 1.129
(1.114) (0.068) (6.020) (0.886)
Long-form modelsd
Current smoker 1.220 1.374 1.172 1.404
(2.696) (2.639) (7.042) (3.751)
Former smoker
(years quit)
<1 2.398 3.097 1.373 2.144
(5.354) (3.444) (5.175) (3.098)
1-4 1.201 1.071 1.409 1.020
(1.148) (0.253) (6.904) (0.094)
5-9 1.193 1.248 1.184 1.031
(1.191) (0.887) (3.648) (0.159)
10+ 1.078 0.973 1.180 1.126
(0.690) (0.150) (4.878) (0.856)70 Moore and Hughes
Table 2.18
Smoking and health care utilization, negative binomial regression estimates/1 nonworker
sample"
aEstimated coefficients from negative binomial regression models, reportedas incidence
rates, with asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses. Robust, cluster-corrected standard
errors.
bN = 9,521 (short form); 9,165 (long form).
cShortform models include controls for age, race, and gender.
dLongform models include short-form variables, plus controls for private and/or public
insurance coverage, seatbelt use, body mass, education, income, region, marital status,
and family size.
Variable Hospital episodes Hospital days Doctor visits
Short-form modelsc




<1 2.939 4.248 2.085
(5.532) (3.839) (7.678)
1-4 2.274 3.106 1.480
(4.767) (3.609) (4.902)
5-9 1.522 1.197 1.224
(2.305) (0.556) (2.511)
10+ 1.296 1.022 1.179
(1.918) (0.096) (2.822)
Long-form modelsd




<1 2.850 4.198 1.840
(5.377) (3.775) (6.420)
1-4 1.942 2.472 1.548
(3.847) (2.784) (5.383)
5-9 1.417 1.209 1.254
(1.905) (0.578) (2.831)
10+ 1.231 1.129 1.127
(1.522) (0.522) (2.073)The Health Care Consequences of Smoking 71
shocks are serious enough to cause the person to leave the labor mar-
ket, the magnitudes of the recent quit effects should be greater than
those for workers.
The final set of results in table 2.19 present estimates of the reduced
form. Estimated tax effects by age group are provided there for both
short- and long-form models of each of the four health care outcomes.
In the short-form results, there are fairly strong and consistent results
for hospitalizations of older workers. This result holds up somewhat in
the long form, although the estimates are less precise. Given the nature
of the exercise, however, where large samples are required to estimate
small effects, this comparison is not surprising. Given the inclusion of
the region dummies and the other variables in the long form, the esti-
mated tax effects are very difficult to estimate precisely. In the pooled
long-form results, however, the point estimates indicate a one half of
1 percent reduction in the hospitalization rate for a 1 cent increase (in
1983 dollars) in the excise tax rate. At this rate, the 4-cent-per-pack tax
increases of the early 1990s would result in cost savings of at most
2 percent, and most likely less, due to the effects of inflation.
V.Conclusions
This article sought to examine the sources of health care savings due
to smoking-related regulations. While the focus of the empirical analy-
sis was on taxes, any intervention that affects the full price of smoking,
such as increases in the ex ante or ex post costs of product liability risk,
increased insurance prices, public smoking bans, or increases in ex-
pected health costs due to information programs, will have qualita-
tively similar effects. When the endogenous nature of health care costs
is taken into account, the costs of smoking rise considerably. From the
perspective of smoking cessation, failure to control for reverse causa-
tion leads to an overstatement of the health care costs of former smok-
ers and a corresponding understatement of the costs of current
smoking.
In examining the effects of taxes on smoking status, we found mixed
evidence. In some specifications, the cigarette tax appears to reduce
current smoking on both the initiation and quit margins. However, this
result is sensitive to the inclusion of additional control variables. In
particular, region effects seem to eliminate much of the state-level
effects of taxes, which may reflect the presence of other smokingTable 2.19
Smoking and health care utilization, negative binomial reduced form regression esti-
mates,a age-specific estimates of tax effects, worker sampleb
aEsfimated coefficients from negative binomial regression models, reported as incidence
rates, with asymptotic z-statistics in parentheses. Robust, cluster-corrected standard
errors.
bN = 24,646 (short form); 23,913 (long form).
cShOrtfOrm models include controls for age, race, and gender.
dLongform models include short-form variables, plus controls for private and/or public












Age 18-21 1.006 1.024 0.999 0.992
(0.708) (0.647) (0.433) (0.561)
Age 22-25 1.004 1.011 1.007 1.007
(0.448) (0.842) (3.146) (0.783)
Age 26-30 0.994 0.997 1.007 0.999
(0.865) (0.245) (3.797) (0.180)
Age 31-35 0.982 0.991 1.306 0.991
(2.782) (0.950) (2.842) (0.180)
Age 36-45 0.992 0.996 1.002 1.001
(1.687) (0.498) (1.392) (0.085)
Age 46-55 0.984 0.979 1.003 0.983
(3.292) (2.728) (1.935) (2.025)
Age 56-65 0.997 1.003 1.004 1.004
(0.604) (0.377) (1.977) (0.353)
Pooled sample 0.992 0.997 1.004 0.996
(3.685) (0.824) (5.428) (1.159)
Long-form models"
Age 18-21 1.001 1.004 0.999 0.983
(0.056) (0.232) (0.048) (0.937)
Age 22-25 1.009 1.012 1.003 0.984
(0.834) (0.624) (0.808) (1.080)
Age 26-30 0.997 1.009 1.007 1.006
(0.358) (0.585) (2.722) (0.478)
Age 31-35 0.986 1.003 0.996 1.001
(1.585) (0.209) (0.129) (0.073)
Age 36-45 0.995 0.985 0.999 1.005
(0.838) (1.339) (0.695) (0.461)
Age 46-55 0.990 0.980 0.997 0.982
(1.434) (1.685) (1.176) (1.388)
Age 56-65 0.997 0.999 0.997 1.012
(0.505) (1.064) (1.292) (0.653)
Pooled sample 0.995 1.001 1.000 1.002
(1.697) (0.214) (0.475) (0.445)The Health Care Consequences of Smoking 73
policies that vary by region or cultural differences across regions that
are correlated with both tax rates and smoking. Because there is so little
variation in the tax rate within states in our sample, however, the ab-
sence of an effect in the long form might simply reflect limitations of
the design. Additional research, with longer time frames and better
measures of other state- and region-specific factors, will help resolve
this issue.
Our findings can be summarized as follows: the health care costs of
smoking initiation and the health care benefits of smoking cessation
may be greater than previously believed. If taxes or otherregulations
affect these aspects of smoking status, then they will have effects be-
yond the revenue effects currently discussed in the policy arena. In par-
ticular, they may reduce future costs and may provide a means of
financing existing costs of smoking by leading to reductions in both ini-
tiation and cessation.
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and Chicago for comments. All remaining errors are our own. MJM would like to thank
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Associate Professor, Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, Univer-
sity of Chicago. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily
those of the Olin Foundation or the National Bureau of Economic Research, nor of any
other organization.
See also Viscusi 1994.
Smoking studies are summarized in Chaloupka and Warner 2000, Manning et al. 1993,
and Viscusi 1992.
See, however, Rodgers 1996 on the mortality effects of safety caps.
See Chaloupka and Warner 2000 for an extensive review.
For tax effects, see the work of Grossman and his colleagues (1993); for information
policies, see Schneider, Klein, and Murphy 1981; for laws restricting indoor smoking, see
Chaloupka 1994 and Jacobson and Wasserman 1997.
See, for example, Warner 1986 and Harris 1987.
See Moore 1996 and Tollison and Wagner 1992.
See Viscusi 1994.
See Moore 2000.
See Moore and Hughes 2000.74 Moore and Hughes
Nominal values are deflated for purposes of the regression estimation using the over-
all consumer price index.
It should be emphasized that these figures represent short-run effects only. Estimates
of a production relationship with stock effects, although interesting in their own right,
are unnecessary for purposes of this example, which is meant only to illustrate the poten-
tial consequences of treating smoking as exogenous in a health production function.
See Moore 1996 for a discussion of this result and a decomposition of the result into
more detailed mortality categories.
See Evans and Ringel 1999.
In the period covered by this data, there is one recorded instance of a tax increase ex-
plicitly targeting health improvement: in New Hampshire in 1984.
See Farrel and Fuchs 1982 and Kenkel 1991.
The sequential structure of the decisions suggests a two-stage probit model with
selectivity at the former/current smoking stage. However, identification in the NHIS
would be difficult because there is little information available to identify the never smok-
ing model via exclusion restrictions. Identification of the nonlinearity of the probits is
possible, in principle, but requires some untenable assumptions about functional form.
Of course, this calculation assumes that the cross-cohort effects observed in the data
accurately represent the life-cycle costs for any given cohort. It also bears mentioning
that an increase in longevity could entail an increase in lifetime health care costs. Re-
duced smoking should entail a decrease in costs, holding longevity constant, however,
and this result is the one we are describing.
In discussing the effects of a tax increase here and in the remainder of the article, we
will use a figure of $1 per pack in 1983 prices to reflect the normalization of taxes used in
the estimates.
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